abstract: Over the last 30 years, trends such as service sector growth, welfare state expansion and rising female participation rates have promoted increasing heterogeneity within the occupational system. Accordingly, this article argues that the class map has to be redrawn in order to grasp these changes in the employment structure. For that purpose, it develops the bases of a new class schema that partly shifts its focus from hierarchical divisions to horizontal cleavages. The middle class is not conceptualized as a unitary grouping and the manual/non-manual divide is not used as a decisive class boundary. Instead, emphasis is put on differences in marketable skills and the work logic. The schema is expected to more accurately reflect the class location of unskilled service employees and to make visible the political divide within the salaried middle class. This expectation is empirically examined with survey data from Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Findings for earnings and promotion prospects indicate that the schema successfully captures the hierarchical dimension in the class structure. Moreover, results for party support and union membership suggest that the schema grasps a salient horizontal cleavage between managers and sociocultural professionals.
Introduction
In the 1990s, political scientists and sociologists engaged in a heated debate on the salience of the concept of class. Some authors argued that social classes are dying, others made a case for the persistent significance of class for the understanding of modern societies' workings (e.g. Lee and Turner, 1996; Evans, 1999 Evans, , 2000 Clark and Lipset, 2001; Brettschneider IS et al., 2002) . While this controversy attracted much interest, surprisingly little attention was paid to the fact that class analysis still rests on concepts developed during the Golden Age of Capitalism. The dominant class schema in European sociology, associated with the writings of Robert Erikson and John H. Goldthorpe, largely reflects the occupational system prevailing up to the mid-1970s, typical of high industrialism. Yet over the last 30 years, trends such as service sector growth, welfare state expansion and rising female participation rates have substantially altered Western Europe's employment structure. At the upper end of the occupational hierarchy, educational upgrading has fostered the growth of the salaried middle class. At the lower end, deindustrialization has reduced the numbers of the unskilled industrial workforce, while routine service jobs taken on by women have been on the rise. The occupational system has thus become both more heterogeneous and more opaque.
Accordingly, this article argues that the class map has to be redrawn in order to integrate into class analysis these shifts in the employment structure. For that purpose, the theoretical bases of a new class schema are outlined that partly shifts its focus from hierarchical boundaries to horizontal cleavages: the salaried middle class is not conceptualized as a unitary grouping and the manual/non-manual divide not used as a class boundary. Instead, heavy emphasis is put on the difference in the work logic of various occupational groups. In a second step, this new class schema is used to empirically analyse aspects of employment stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Based on individual data stemming from socioeconomic surveys, my comparative analysis looks at two different sets of variables: it first focuses on the distribution of material advantages across the class schema, examining earnings differentials and promotion prospects. Second, it explores the sociostructural context of political mobilization and looks at party support and trade union membership of different classes.
Employment Shifts and an Opaque Class Structure
Over the last 30 years, the spectacular expansion of service jobs stands in sharp contrast with deindustrialization and the massive decline in the ranks of blue-collar workers. In parallel, new production methods have led to a skill upgrading of the shrinking industrial workforce and thus blurred the distinction between worker and employee status (Gallie, 1996; Müller and Noll, 1996; Kern, 1998) . In terms of class enquiry, these developments pose an analytical challenge on the level of both the working and the middle classes. On the level of the working class, low-skilled occupations have not disappeared from labour markets dominated by large service sectors: sales assistants, cooks in fast-food outlets, call centre clerks or assistant nurses are all employed in jobs to which no middle-class status attaches. Although employees in routine sales and service occupations do not benefit from more advantageous working conditions than (mostly) male production workers, these mainly female workers do not fit easily into established class schemas. Division lines typical of industrial employment such as the blue-collar/white-collar boundary or the manual/nonmanual divide are of little use when dealing with these occupational groups. Hence, it has been argued that the transformation imposed upon production workers and the presence of various types of 'service workers' and 'low-level employees' have created 'a twilight zone between the working and the middle classes' (Sainsbury, 1987: 508) . A similar problem of analytical opacity emerges when shifting the focus to the salaried middle class. Educational upgrading, service expansion and welfare state development have not only fostered the growth of managerial and professional staff, but also promoted increasing heterogeneity within its ranks (Crouch, 1999; Goos and Manning, 2003) . In consequence, it has become quite unpromising to account for the political behaviour of the salaried middle class conceptualized as a unitary category: variance in party support within the middle class has come to approximate variance within the entire population (Kriesi, 1998 ). Yet while it is apparent that the salaried middle class is made up of factions that occupy very different positions in the labour market, attempts in the literature to account for this heterogeneity have been few (Joye and Schuler, 1995; Müller, 1999; Güveli et al., 2003; van de Werfhorst and de Graaf, 2004 ) and, to a large extent, concentrated on the difference between professionals and managers (Savage et al., 1992; Manza and Brooks, 1999) . The bulk of research into social mobility and class voting continues to rely on the manual/non-manual divide and to treat the salaried middle class as a monolithic bloc (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993; Shavit and Müller, 1998; Evans, 1999) . Hence, my objective in constructing a new class schema is to shed light on the twilight zone making up the working class and to enquire into the monolithic bloc of the salaried middle class.
A New Class Schema Based on Differences in the Work Logic
As starting point of the schema, I adopt Erikson and Goldthorpe's concept of employment relationship in order to differentiate between more or less advantageous positions within labour markets and production units (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993: 37) . Although Erikson and Goldthorpe repeatedly insist on the categorical and non-hierarchical properties of their schema, their concept of employment relationship indisputably contains a major hierarchical component (see Prandy, 2000: 250; Oesch, 2003: 250-1) . This hierarchical dimension results from employers' rational action: depending on the importance of an employee's marketable skills, employers will offer a more or less advantageous employment relationship in order to obtain maximal productivity from their personnel (Evans and Mills, 2000; Goldthorpe, 2000: 206-29) . Hence, when seen from the employer's perspective, members of the middle class on the one hand, and the large category comprising the 'twilight zone' of low-skilled service employees and production workers on the other, may appear to be relatively homogeneous -to the extent that a comparable degree of advantage applies to their employment relationship. However, when looked at from the employee's perspective, important horizontal differences persist within these two categories (Müller, 1999: 143) . This is quite evident for industrial operatives, clerical employees and service workers, three groups that clearly evolve in different work environments and production units. Likewise, structural cleavages appear to run through the salaried middle class and separate professionals in the social and cultural services from technical experts and managers (Kriesi, 1989) . In consequence, I argue that greater analytical salience is attained by adding a horizontal criterion to the vertical class criterion. Hence, mounting employment heterogeneity is analysed by combining the hierarchical perspective of the employer (the demand side of the labour market) with the horizontal perspective of the employee (the supply side of the labour market). While hierarchical differences are usefully captured by varying degrees of advantage attaching to the employment relationship (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993) , horizontal differentiation is less easily conceptualized. Unlike Wright (1985) , Runciman (1990) or Savage et al. (1992) , I do not believe horizontal differences to be primarily rooted in diverse assets, sources of economic power or educational resources. In particular, the division between managers relying on organizational authority and professionals depending on expertise seems too simplistic. With the proliferation of business schools, managers have become increasingly skilldependent and thus professionalized. Moreover, the use of an asset-based dividing line is strictly limited to the middle class, as assets and educational resources are of little value when distinguishing within the large group of production workers and routine sales and service employees. It appears more productive to enlarge the asset-based approach by drawing on contributions made by authors such as Kriesi (1989) , EspingAndersen (1993b) , Kitschelt (1994) , Gallie et al. (1998 ) or Müller (1999 . In their attempt to capture shifts in stratification, these authors put heavy emphasis on the nature of employees' work experience, their work role and their insertion into the division of labour. Whether conceptualized as a threefold antagonism within the salaried middle class (Kriesi, 1989 (Kriesi, , 1998 Müller, 1999) , as an opposition between a 'Fordist' and a 'postindustrial' class hierarchy (Esping-Andersen, 1993b) or as a contrast between occupations dealing with 'human individuality' as opposed to occupations involving object-or document-related tasks (Kitschelt, 1994: 18; Gallie et al., 1998) , the decisive element of horizontal differentiation is in all three cases the work logic in which employees evolve.
Taking this criterion a step further, I identify three basically different work logics within the large category of employees: a technical work logic, an organizational work logic and an interpersonal work logic. Depending on whether an occupation involves the deployment of technical expertise and craft, the administration of organizational power or face-to-face attendance to people's personal demands, the work logic and primary orientation differ in fundamental ways. I argue that this criterion of work logic horizontally discriminates between categories that may appear homogeneous with respect to their employment relationship. The concept of work logic captures differences between occupations: in (1) the setting of the work process (the potential for division of labour), (2) the nature of authority relations, (3) the ensuing primary orientations and (4) the skill requirements. Based on these four dimensions, the salient features of each work logic are listed in Table 1 . Although the distinction between the three work logics is schematic, it closely overlaps with empirically observable cleavages in the employment structure. Hence at the level of the middle class, it reflects central differences between categories such as technicians (e.g. computer assistants), associate managers (e.g. junior financial managers) and sociocultural semiprofessionals (e.g. social workers) who otherwise, on the basis of their similarly advantageous employment relationships, would be placed in the same class. 1 The associate manager, as part of the bureaucratic division of labour, depends on his/her ability to coordinate and control others, while evolving him/herself in a clear-cut command structure. Through his/her (present or future) participation in organizational power, the associate manager is expected to show a high level of loyalty towards the employing organization. In contrast, the sociocultural semi-professional is primarily dependent on communicative skills (and expertise) and evolves in an autonomous work setting where authority relations are diluted. As the sociocultural semi-professional depends on the cooperation of her/his 'clients' (students or patients) in providing her/his services, she/he is likely to advocate their interests against organizational interference. Finally, the technician is in an intermediate position. The technician's daily work experience makes him/her more likely to direct his/her primary orientation towards his/her professional community than the organization. At the same time, the technical nature of his/her work tasks provides more potential for the division of labour than is the case in the interpersonal service logic. At the level of the working class, the same criterion of work logic captures the horizontal differences between categories that in terms of hierarchy are not easily separated, such as routine operatives (e.g. assemblers) in the technical work logic, routine office clerks (e.g. mail sorting clerks) in the organizational work logic and routine service workers (e.g. nursing aides) in the interpersonal work logic. Table 2 assembles the class schema resulting from the combination of the two axes: the vertical axis differentiates classes according to the level of marketable skills attaching to an occupation and provides a proxy for the degree of advantage in the employment relationship; the horizontal axis discriminates between different work logics. Based on the employment status, I separate into a fourth work logic employers and the selfemployed from employed wage-earners. By adding this independent work logic, I obtain the 17-class schema shown in the table. Each work logic gives rise to a separate hierarchy that is dominated by a professional or managerial class and ends off with a routine class, defined by low skill levels. For each class I have listed two frequent and characteristic occupations (for a more in-depth discussion of the schema, see Oesch, 2006) .
While this 17-class schema permits a detailed analysis of the employment structure, there are practical reasons speaking in favour of a tighter version of the schema. Besides having the merit of greater parsimony, collapsed versions often respond to the statistical necessity of having sufficiently large cell counts. Accordingly, the detailed 17-class version can be collapsed into an eight-class version as indicated by the solid lines in Table 2 .
It is obvious that these categories are not social classes in the Weberian sense of groupings that share a collective identity and a common organization over time. Our use of the class concept comes closer to what Scott (1994: 934) labels class locations -defined as the present market and work situation pertaining to the individual -than to the more encompassing concept of social class, defined as the larger demographic unit pertaining to the family household. Scott's concept of class location is very similar to what Kocka calls an economic class: individuals who, due to a common economic position, may share latent interests, but not necessarily anything else (Kocka, 1980: 104) . The concept stands in contrast to the more ambitious notion of social class, understood as a unit sharing a collective identity and a common organization. Hence, our use of the class term is not fundamentally different from theoretically less burdened concepts such as occupational category or social stratum.
Data, Target Population and Class Operationalization
This study examines employment stratification for Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. The first three countries constitute prime examples of Esping-Andersen's (1990) different welfare regimes: Britain stands for the liberal, Germany for the conservative and Sweden for the social democratic regime. Switzerland is a hybrid case, 'a continental model with a liberal face' (Armingeon, 2001: 150) . For these four countries exist datasets that are both sufficiently large and include detailed information about employment, the workplace and political behaviour. When allocating individuals to the class schema, I rely on information from three variables:
1. About the employment status, separating employers and the selfemployed from the much larger group of employees; 2. About the number of employees, distinguishing between large and small employers on the one hand and the self-employed without employees on the other; 3. About the occupational title, assigning individuals to different work logics and different hierarchical levels on the basis of their occupation.
Indisputably, the last information is of greatest consequence for the construction of the class schema. In order to distinguish as precisely as possible between different occupations, I have used the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) at the detailed four-digit level for the British, German and Swiss samples. For the Swedish sample, data are classified according to NYK-83 (Nordic Occupational Classification) at the three-digit level. The degree of specificity is rather similar for the four datasets: 216 occupational codes are distinguished in the Swiss sample, 267 in the Swedish, 298 in the German and 300 in the British. The allocation process undoubtedly implies subjective judgement about the work logic and employment relationship of occupational groups, and thus provides large ground for disagreement. I answer this concern by making my choices as transparent as possible and thus display in the Appendix the ISCO codes attributed to each class (see Table A1 ). For a series of intermediate jobs, occupational information is, even at the detailed level of ISCO four-digit, too general for allocation within the schema. 4 Hence, although I agree that skills only matter if they are exploited, I have chosen to include educational information when allocating individuals employed in intermediate occupations to the class schema. 5 I summarize the procedure followed to apply the class schema in Table A2 in the Appendix. In the literature, controversy occurs over the question whether education may be used to construct class variables. While, in theory, it is desirable to keep the effects of education and class separate (Rose and Pevalin, 2003) , in the practice of commonly used occupational data, the two concepts are closely linked to each other (Elias, 1997) . In effect, the international standard ISCO-88 has explicitly been designed around the skills required for competent performance of the job and is thus strongly related to the amount of formal education and training generally associated with competent task performance (Elias, 1997: 7) . Besides the (dominant) practical concern, there is also a theoretical rationale for integrating educational Oesch A Changing Class Structure information when allocating individuals employed in intermediate jobs, as it allows us to account for the crucial skill barrier that separates vocationally (or generally) trained workers from their unskilled colleagues. Particularly in Germany and Switzerland, vocational training is a precondition for entering the labour force in a skilled rather than an unskilled occupation Buchmann and Sacchi, 1998) . This skill barrier basically remains insurmountable for unskilled workers over time (Blossfeld et al., 1993: 114) . 6
Comparing the Class Distribution of the Workforce
The focus of this empirical analysis lies on both vertical and horizontal segregation within the employment structure. Accordingly, variables are selected to reflect, on the one hand, the distribution of material advantage across the schema (a dimension that I expect to follow hierarchical lines), and, on the other, the structural context of political mobilization (a dimension that may reveal horizontal differences). Analyses are divided into three parts. In the first part, I briefly map out the class distribution of the workforce in the four countries under study, paying attention to differences in the work logic and gender. In the second part, focus is shifted to the vertical dimension of the schema by examining the relationship between class and different hierarchical indicators such as work income and promotion chances. Finally, I enquire into the class character of party support and trade union membership.
The analysis starts out with a look at the distribution of economically active individuals across classes and work logics (Table 3 ). Employment shares for the different work logics closely reflect national differences in the economic trajectory. To begin with, Britain's employment clusters heavily in the organizational work logic and features an unusually large share of both managerial and clerical jobs. This is likely the result of the expansion of business services in general and finance in particular. In comparison, Sweden features a much lower share of managerial and clerical personnel. The finding that Sweden is 'undermanaged' is not new and has been accounted for by the country's large public sector (Ahrne and Wright, 1983: 223) . In effect, Table 3 clearly reveals the importance of Sweden's social democratic welfare regime: a third of Swedish employment is set in the interpersonal work logic that comprises jobs in health, education and social services. In contrast, the still markedly industrial character of the German economy is apparent from the large proportion of individuals employed as crafts workers or routine operatives: 25 percent of total employment. Finally, Switzerland combines a substantial share of managers with a comparatively large proportion of self-employed: as in Sweden, the two categories forming Table 3 ) reveal heavily segregated labour markets. Among the self-employed and in the technical work logic, women are a small minority in all four countries. In particular, the skilled crafts appear almost exclusively reserved for men. In contrast, women make up a large majority within the interpersonal service logic: this is not surprising as it is in these classes that traditional domestic tasks such as laundering, food catering, care of preschoolers and the elderly have been incorporated into the formal economy. Growth in these classes is, to a large extent, the consequence of the expansion of public welfare (EspingAndersen, 1999; Charles, 2000) . The most balanced composition in terms of horizontal gender segregation is found in the office. However, this conceals considerable hierarchical gender segregation: in all four countries, men tend to work in managerial positions and women fill the clerical ranks (Charles, 2003) .
The Distribution of Advantage across Classes
I focus on two indicators to measure the hierarchical dimension within the employment structure: work income and promotion prospects. As a measure of material advantage, heavy emphasis must be laid on the role of earnings: an employment relationship essentially boils down to an exchange of work effort for economic resources. In order to separate the class effect from that of other determinants of earnings such as age and gender, I resort to multivariate analyses and estimate a basic wage equation with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The converted regression coefficients are displayed for all classes in Table 4 . Their interpretation is straightforward: the percentages shown present the wage increase that goes along with being in a given class as compared to being in the lowest-paid class of routine service workers, sex, age and employment status being held constant. They reveal a clear-cut contrast between the most and the least advantaged classes. Moreover, it is apparent that routine operatives earn in all four countries higher wages than routine service workers. This gives us a first hint as to the misfit of the manual/ non-manual divide. In terms of work income, the two manual classes of craft workers and operatives are nowhere situated at the very bottom of the hierarchy. Low income is concentrated -besides in the very small agricultural class -among routine service workers, a category whose standard work tasks cannot be described as manual.
In terms of pay, there is no evidence for a manual/non-manual divide. But by focusing on presently received compensation, I make an essentially n.a n.a n.a n.a Self-employed professionals 18 75 27 66 n.a n.a n.a n.a Petite bourgeoisie w. employees
(1) 36 0 (9) n.a n.a n.a n.a Petite bourgeoisie w/o employees -14 (10) (-14) (-7) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a Total share in workforce n.a n.a n.a n. static analysis of stratification and overlook that social classes are groupings that share particular sets of social relations over time (Weber, 1964: 679) . Esping-Andersen's (1999: 157) use of Schumpeter's omnibus analogy is very illustrative in this respect: the bus of low-skilled service workers may always be full of people, but if they are never the same, the experience is unlikely to have lasting consequences for life chances. Accordingly, people's mobility prospects appear to be at least as consequential for life chances as are momentary earnings: low-skilled service workers may earn less than operatives, but if their jobs imply a different trajectory in the labour market than do manual occupations, earnings differences are of limited relevance (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1993a; Tåhlin, 1993; Evans and Mills, 2000) . Our cross-sectional research setting does not permit an in-depth analysis of these issues of career mobility. Still, we can look more closely at differences in promotion prospects. These are displayed for employee classes in Table 4 . Although question wording differed between the four datasets, the answers capture roughly the same phenomenon of career advancement. Results show that promotion prospects are everywhere distributed in a hierarchical way: classes at the top of a work logic benefit from consistently better prospects than classes at the bottom. Technical experts, managers and sociocultural professionals have the best chances of career advancement in their current job, whereas operatives and routine service workers are equally unlikely to get promoted. The finding about the hierarchical character of promotion chances is reinforced by calculations (not shown here) of the mean age of each class. Among the large category of employees, a double-peaked age structure can be observed: individuals are oldest either in the most or the least desirable classes. At the top, this is due to a ceiling effect: it is at the end of a career that people arrive at the executive or expert level. At the bottom, it suggests that workers on the most routine level are to a considerable extent imprisoned in low-skilled jobs. This places them in opposition to individuals in the skilled service, office or craft classes who on average are youngest and seem thus more likely to improve their positions over time (see Oesch, 2006) .
Party Preferences and Union Membership
In a last set of analyses, I shift my attention to the structural context of political mobilization and enquire into the demand side of politics by examining party preferences and collective organization of different classes. For this reason, I have computed in Table 5 (columns I-III) for each class the share of individuals who support Labour in Britain or the social democratic parties in Germany and Switzerland (unfortunately, the n.a n.a n.a Public sector job n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 1.2 1.0 1.7*** Pseudo R 2 (Nagelkerke) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n. question about party support is not asked in the Swedish LNU survey).
Findings for Britain and Germany show that despite Blair and Schröder's explicitly business-friendly stance, their labour parties remain significantly more popular among the working classes than among employers and managers. In Britain, Labour receives largest support from classes with few socioeconomic resources such as low-skilled operatives and service workers and is least successful among capital owners such as large employers and the petite bourgeoisie. In Germany, the Social Democratic Party still has its stronghold among the industrial classes of technicians, skilled craft workers and operatives, but remains strongly underrepresented among employers and the self-employed.
Figures for social democratic support in Switzerland, while revealing no hierarchical pattern, clearly point to a cleavage within the salaried middle class. This cleavage opposes managers, who -comparable to employers and the petite bourgeoisie -manifest little sympathy for the left, with sociocultural (semi-)professionals, who strongly support the Social Democratic Party. In Switzerland -and arguably in the Netherlands (Güveli et al., 2003; van de Werfhorst and de Graaf, 2004 ) -professionals in education, social welfare, health and cultural services appear to have become the class that most clearly leans towards parties on the left (see also Kriesi, 1998) . However, the question remains why this divide is only visible in Switzerland, but not in Britain and Germany. One hypothesis is that employees in the sociocultural professions vote not so much for traditional social democratic politics, but for postmaterialist policies that increase individual autonomy and civil liberties, and reduce market dependence and bureaucratic control. In sum, they may opt for what has been called 'libertarian politics' (Kitschelt, 1994: 26) or 'new politics issues' (Müller, 1999: 145) . While in highly fragmented party systems as in Switzerland or the Netherlands, these issues are primarily promoted by social democratic parties, in systems coming closer to a bipartisan competition as in Germany or Britain, these policies may chiefly be advocated by smaller, left or centre-left parties such as the German Green Party or the British Liberal Democrats. Accordingly, I have computed support for these 'New Left' parties in Table 5 (columns IV-VI). In effect, these figures confirm that the strongest supporters of Liberal Democrats in Britain and the Green Party in Germany are professionals and semi-professionals in the social and cultural services. There thus is an obvious similarity between support for the New Left in Britain and Germany and support for the Social Democrats in Switzerland.
However, it has been argued that the bivariate relationship between left support and class may be misleading, as a large majority of the core constituency of the New Left, sociocultural (semi-)professionals, work in the public sector. Accordingly, left-wing support of 'welfare and creative' professionals has been explained by the public sector setting of their jobs (e.g. Kitschelt, 1994; Heath and Savage, 1995; Knutsen, 2001) . In order to examine whether the political divide within the salaried middle class is due to public sector employment, I resort to multivariate analysis and run binary logistic regressions for the determinants of Liberal Democrat (Britain), Green (Germany) and Social Democratic support (Switzerland). I introduce a control variable for public sector employment (as well as sex and age) into these regressions. Results confirm that in Britain, Germany and Switzerland, preferences for parties of the New Left is strongest among sociocultural professionals and semi-professionals (see Table 5 , columns VII-IX). Public sector employment is only significant in Switzerland, yet does not cancel out the strongly positive relation between sociocultural professions and Social Democratic Party support.
Thus, so far, I do not find any evidence for Goldthorpe's expectation that the service class is 'an essentially conservative element within modern societies' (Goldthorpe, 1995: 322) . However, Goldthorpe (1995) also stresses the importance of the consolidation process within the middle class. Hence, the service class may still be heterogeneous politically -but as it is consolidating, each new cohort is expected to move more towards a homogeneous conservative position. I examine this expectation by comparing middle-class support for conservative parties within three different age groups: individuals aged 20-35 years, 36-50 years and 51-65 years. 7 Figure 1 presents the unambiguous finding of a widening cleavage for younger generations. In all three countries, the disparity in conservative support is larger between young managers and sociocultural specialists than between their older counterparts. I thus find no evidence for an increasingly homogeneous and conservative salaried middle class. On the contrary, over the generations, managers and sociocultural professionals appear to become increasingly dissimilar political blocs.
These explorative analyses indicate that different cleavages run through the class structure as regards party support. Within the salaried middle class, we find in all three countries a dividing line between managers and sociocultural professionals with respect to support for the New Left. In Britain and Germany, the working classes diverge from the middle classes with respect to their still solid support of the 'Traditional Left'. In contrast, analyses not shown here reveal that Switzerland's working-class voters, notably craft workers and operatives, are strongly overrepresented among non-voters and populist right-wing voters, choosing either abstention or the anti-establishment and anti-immigration Swiss People's Party, SVP (Oesch, 2005) , the Social Democratic Party being only the third option (see also Mazzoleni et al., 2005) . These findings confirm the importance of the distinction between traditional class voting and total class voting: in all three countries under study there is evidence for total class voting, understood as the way in which classes systematically differ from each other at the polls (Hout et al., 1995: 806 ). Yet while class voting continues to be at work, it seems to involve new alliances (sociocultural professionals and the New Left) and to reverse traditional links (Swiss workers preferring the populist right-wing alternative over the Social Democrats).
Before concluding, I briefly examine the issue of collective organization and compute the share of individuals who are members of a trade union or professional association in each class (see Table 6 ). In spite of the disparity in total membership between high Swedish and low Swiss levels, the class pattern of unionization is strongly comparable across the four countries: everywhere, sociocultural professionals and semi-professionals are the categories that succeed best in organizing their members, followed by the class forming the backbone of industrial unionism, skilled craft workers. In contrast, union membership is below average among managers, office clerks and routine service workers. Hence, also as far as collective organization is concerned, we find no indication for a unitary service class. Moreover, these findings suggest that routine service workers are not only at the margin of the class system, but also struggle unsuccessfully to get effective representation.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that an individual's location in the employment structure continues to determine his or her life chances and to affect his or her political behaviour. Yet in order to make this link visible, these locations must be differentiated more precisely. For this reason, this article presents a new and very detailed class measure. My analysis of labour market stratification rests on the premise that Western Europe's employment structure is not usefully summarized by class schemas based on a monolithic middle class and a working class separated along the manual/nonmanual boundary. On the contrary, I have proposed a schema that partially shifts its focus from the vertical axis to the horizontal axis, combining the hierarchical criterion of marketable skills with the distinction between different work logics. Within the category of employees, heavy emphasis is given to a threefold horizontal division between occupations governed by technical expertise and craft (the technical work logic), occupations involving the administration of bureaucratic power (the organizational work logic) and occupations employed in the face-toface servicing of people's social demands (the interpersonal service logic). The combination of marketable skills and work logic produces a detailed 17-class and a collapsed eight-class schema. When applying the schema to individual data from Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, two principal findings are noteworthy. With respect to material advantage, a bicephalous working class emerges from the analysis: it consists of mainly male routine operatives employed in production and mostly female workers engaged in low-skilled sales and service activities. The comparison of present and future compensation for work reveals that routine service workers do not have a more advantageous employment relationship than routine operatives -on the contrary: in all four countries, routine service workers come last in terms of earnings and share the poor promotion prospects of operatives. Finally, in terms of workplace organization, routine service workers are clearly disadvantaged: unlike operatives, they do not benefit from the organizational support of powerful industrial trade unions. At the level of the middle classes, my analyses confirm the marked difference between managers and sociocultural professionals with respect to party support and collective organization. Although specialists of the social and cultural services benefit from an employment relationship that is comparable to that of managers, they are significantly more likely to support 'New Politics' parties on the left. The divide within the salaried middle class is underpinned by figures for union membership, revealing a large disparity between sociocultural specialists' high levels of collective organization and managers' low levels. In conclusion, my enquiry into employment stratification suggests that neither the salaried middle class nor the working class are usefully operationalized as unitary categories. (and not 2446-2450, 2452-2455, 3220, 2000-2470) 3222-3224, 3226, 3229-3232, 3240-3400, 3450-3451, 3460-3470, 3472-3480 Petite bourgeoisie without Skilled crafts Skilled office Skilled service employees SELF and no employees (and 110, 7120-7142, 7200-7233, 4000-4112, 4114-4141, 4143, 3221, 3225, 3227-3228, 5122, not 2000-2470) 7240-7423, 7430-7520, 8311, 4190-4210, 4213-4221 5141, 5143, 5110-5113, 8324, 8333 5150-5163, 5200-5210, 8323 Routine Routine Routine office Routine service operatives agriculture 7100-7113, 6010-6210, 4113, 4142, 4144, 4211-4212, 5120-5121, 5123-5130, 7129-7130, 8330-8332, 4222-4223 5131-5140, 5142, 5149, 5169, 7143, 7234, 9200-9213 5220-5230, 8320-8322, 7424, 8000-9100-9153 8310, 8312, 8334-8400, 9160-9162, 9300-9333 
